Amrep Corporation

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In THE MATTER OF AMREP CORPORATION Docket 9018. Interlocutory Order, July 12, 1979 OrpDER DENYING MOTION FOR A STAY OF THE INITIAL DETERMINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE On June 14, 1979, respondent, AMREP Corporation, filed a motion with the Commission requesting that the Commission stay the Initial Decision of the administrative law judge so that respondent could have an opportunity to address the Commission on the matter of ex parte communications prior to the issuance of the Initial Decision.1 Respondent makes two arguments in support of its motion. Respondent first argues that Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 556(c), and Rule 3.41(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, require that the comments regarding ex parte communications be made on the record prior to the Initial Decision. Respondent also argues that Rule 3.54(c) limits the Commission’s authority to take evidence in that the Commission has no authority to hear evidence regarding the ex parte communications unless such evidence is brought up in the hearings below. However, we find nothing in the text of any of these citations to support respondent’s arguments. Indeed, the respondent has previously sought injunctive relief on this same issue from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That relief was denied by Judge Gasch on April 9, 1979, for failure of the respondent to exhaust its administrative remedies. In his opinion, Judge Gasch ruled that respondent “. . . will have full opportunity to address the Commission on the matter of the ex parte communications. Furthermore, the Commission, if necessary, is empowered to take additional evidence, if indeed the Administrative Law Judge’s initial decision goes to the Commission.” Opinion at page 8. We fully agree with the opinion of Judge Gasch. The Commission’s appellate procedures provide respondent with an adequate mechanism to address the issue of ex parte communications should it be necessary.” Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to stay the Initial Decision. Accordingly, 1 Respondent also filed a motion to extend time for filing the Initial Decision because of the unlikelihood that the Jommiasion could decide the motion for a stay before what had been a June 22, 1979 filing date. Inasmuch as that date vas extended by the Commission to July 13, 1979, and a decision is now being made on the motion for a stay, the lotion for an extension of time is denied as moot. 2 Moreover, Rule 3.54(a) of the Commigsion’s Rules allows the Commission to hear and take additional evidence on »peal from, or review of, an Initial Decision. See also 5 U.S.C. 552(b). 3 Since our decision not to grant respondent’s motion is based on the fact that adequate procedures exist on appeal, 2 intimate no opinion on complaint counsel’s assertion that the motion should be denied as a dilatory abuse of the mmission’'s Rules of Practice.

AMREP CORP. 131 130 . Interlocutory Order It is ordered, That the motion for a stay of the initial determination by the administrative law judge be, and the same hereby is, denied. Initial Decision 94 F.T.C: